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Outside the School on Woman Leaders’ Leadership Development Abstract School years is the period when people spend their times throughout their educational lives in their institutions and social relations are the social ties set and continue for some time between at least two people consciously and meaningfully for a certain purpose.

1This article deals with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) coming from an Islamic tradition as one of the most important ‘Others’ of the Kemalist state tradition in Turkey and the on-going conflict between the laws and institutions within the Kemalist state from an historical perspective. AKP came into prominence in the elections held on 3 November 2002 in Turkey when it received 34% of the votes, then in 2007 it reached 47% and finally the party obtained almost 50% of the votes in the 2011 elections. The question whether the deviation/change generated by AKP governments in the traditionalism of the Kemalist state, with their policies and practices as an Other of the Kemalist state, is permanent or temporary will be evaluated in the context of the historical dynamics and perpetuating factors of the Kemalist state.

2Historical, cultural, religious, political and psychological factors, which have motivated decision makers and implementers, should be taken into account when explaining events that occurred in the past. However, objective results may be obtained with a methodological method based on the formation process in social sciences. The historical experiences, good or bad, right or wrong, affect the response of a nation to the events and forces in the political system. [1] It may not be possible to conceive and predict the behaviour of a nation without being aware of its constructed memory.

3For this reason, we should first look at the memories of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his associates who founded the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923. In this way, the philosophy of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey and its dynamics, which bring continuity, will be better understood. When we try to understand the memories of Mustafa Kemal and those involved in the national struggle, we can conclude that the dramatic events which took place during the process of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, especially the disappointing setbacks suffered after the establishment of the Second Constitutionalist Period—considered as the “salvation of the country” in 1908—left profound effects.

4Having been put into force again in 1908, Kânûn-i Esâsî (the First Constitution of the Ottoman Empire) unexceptionally named every national of the Ottoman State as Ottoman, without making any religious discrimination. Ottoman citizens had to speak Turkish as the official language of the state employed in the state bodies. [2] It was considered that an “Ottoman” identity could be created to constitute a powerful state by bringing all elements of the Ottoman State together and putting an end to the external interventions. The condition of making Turkish the official language as well as secondary and higher education language in accordance with the Kânûn-i Esâsî was perceived by the non Turkish ethnic groups as Turkish oppression. [3] The improvement in the teaching of Turkish was, to some extent, going to cause ‘Turkification’ of ethnicities other than Turks. The Union and Progress committee [4] started to abandon the idea of “Ottomanism” because they did not want to give up their programme of achieving their own national independence. There was no way to favour the Turks as the largest and most loyal ethnic group and at the same time to salvage the state. [5] The bias towards Turks was going to cause acceleration of the separation process of other ethnic groups and thus the dissolution process of the Ottoman Empire that will lead to additional disappointing setbacks:

1. The first setback was suffered when Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Crete separated from Turkey. Bulgaria was turned into a principality having autonomy and paying tax under the sovereignty of the Ottoman State as a result of the Berlin Treaty signed on 13 July 1878 after the end of the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian war, while Bosnia-Herzegovina was occupied by Austria-Hungary. Reforms were going to be made as well in Crete. [6] While the Ottoman State was engaging in elections after the Second Constitutionalist period, Austria, taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the elections, declared its annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 5 October 1908. On the same day, Crete announced that it would merge with Greece. Having agreed with Austria before the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria promised to prevent any reaction from the Slavic world to this annexation. In return for this, Austria agreed to provide military and diplomatic assistance for Bulgaria, which was decisive in enabling it to proclaim its independence on 6 October 1908. While the Ottoman Empire was experiencing a regime shift at home and the Kanun-i Esasi, which was considered to be almost the sole remedy for the salvation of the country, was put into force again, ?smet ?nönü described the situation as follows: “Patriots feel the pain of a slap of the insidious enemies on their face.”[7]
2. The second setback was the reactionary rebellion against the new regime. The event called ‘The 31 March Incident’ was a rebellion against the new regime of the Ottomans. According to those who encouraged the rebellion, the Unionists and their government imposed secularism on the country; Islam was being lost and the people were becoming unbelievers (K?fir). Responsible for this was the government, with a leading role being taken by young and educated officers at the head of the military. The rebel troops called for resignation of the Council of Ministers/Meclis-i Vükelâ, dissolution of the deputies, implementation of sharia law and return of ranked officers to their positions. [8] The rebellion, in which it was thought that Abdülhamid II also had a role, had a tremendous influence on periphery cities. As a result, the Movement Army, including Mustafa Kemal, came from Thessalonica—where the centre of the Third Army was located—to Istanbul and suppressed the rebellion. The fight was again won by the Union and Progress committee and was supported by the Army. [9] The words ‘31 March Incident’ and “reactionary” were equivalent and joined. Moreover, this was not a temporary and restricted reactionary incident. [10] When observed, it can be concluded that there is a perception that the reactionaries, regime enemies, the Sultan in the position of the top-level decision-maker of the state, local and foreign elements who did not desire a stable Ottoman state, the leading opposition party of the time, as the Ahrar Party, all had a role in the incident and this perception is still maintained in the memories of the participants.
3. The third setback is result of the rebellions, which required military intervention in Yemen, Macedonia and Albania during the period 1908-1911. The rebellion of the Albanians, most of whom were Muslim and who could access significant positions both in the Ottoman administration and the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), was perceived as a devastating blow and remained as such in the Turkish memory. The same stands for the rebellion in Macedonia. The founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal, was born and brought up in Macedonia. Macedonia figures prominently in the conquest stories of the Ottoman army, while the Turks settled there are named “evlâd-? fatihan,” “Children of Conquerors.” [11] After the other Ottoman Empire countries had been lost since the 17^th century, Macedonia became a productive plain where groups with the desire to establish a state arose. Finally, In the rebellion that broke out in Yemen a number of Ottoman soldiers died in everlasting small-scale wars. Henceafter, Yemen became a synonym in folk songs for the painful situation of the Ottoman soldiers.
4. The fourth setback was the attempt of the Italians to occupy Libya. The chargé d’affaires of Italy in Istanbul, Senor Martino, sent to the Bab?ali (the government) a note requesting the evacuation of Tripoli and Benghazi and their surrender to Italy on 28 September 1911. [12] Having decided that the Ottomans did not have sufficient strength to fight in Libya, the Italians also wanted to exploit internal political conflicts of the Ottomans. Certain volunteer officers, including Mustafa Kemal, were sent to Libya where they have organised the local population and gave a strong resistance to the Italians. Additional aim of the Ottomans was to counter the hunger of the other states for their territories and to prevent a new “fait accompli.” [13] The Ottomans had to leave Libya to the Italians on the eruption of the First Balkans War.
5. The fifth setback was initiated by the Balkans Wars. While the war with Italy was ongoing, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece, wanted to exploit the internal disorder due to the long period of war with Italy and party conflicts. The military situation of the Ottoman State became what may be characterised as a catastrophe in just a few weeks, when almost the whole of Rumelia [14] was occupied by the Bulgarians. Turks had never suffered such a severe smack down in any other period of their history. [15] The 1912-1913 Balkans Wars were a great disaster as the empire lost almost all of its lands in Europe—over 150 thousand square kilometres that were inhabited by nearly four million people. The Ottoman sovereignty in Rumelia and the Aegean region came to an end, when all the islands, including those located in the territorial waters of Anatolia, were captured by Greece, with the exception of the Dodecanese Islands, which were under Italian occupation. Istanbul lost everything again, as had been the case following the Ottoman-Russian war in 1878 and was swarming with Muslim refugees. [16] However, the case got worse as the lost regions (Macedonia, Albania, Thrace) were the regions that had constituted the roots of the Empire for a period of five hundred years. These areas were the richest and most developed provinces where most of the Ottoman governing notables came from. Having said that the “Emigrants are the national memories of the lost countries,” Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who was also a Turk born in Rumelia, obviously carried the deep scars caused by the loss of these lands where he was born and brought up. According to his words, the evacuation of the Turks from Rumelia was “a great catastrophe which created an infinite and unforgettable pain in the heart of every Turk”. [17]
6. The sixth setback was caused by the First World War. Even though no one believed that the war would be totally lost, there was a fear that Turkish lands would be destroyed until the end of the war and Turkish people, namely majority, would encounter catastrophic poverty. This was aggravated by the retreat of the Ottoman armies from Palestine, Erzurum and Baghdad and with their continuous defeats on the European fronts during the war—which continued for a period of four years—followed by the refuging of the local community to Anatolia. [18] The history of the Ottoman State, which had an army of more than two and a half million soldiers in three units fighting on eight fronts, culminated in the Mondros Armistice in late 1918. [19] This time, the danger of losing the last remaining shelter for Turks, namely Anatolia, emerged. Actually, no other land than Anatolia remained, where the Turkish population could go. Every time territory has been lost, they had continuously immigrated to the remaining lands of the Ottoman empire. However, the disintegration of Anatolia started after the loss of Rumelia when the Turks begun to fear that Anatolia may also be lost for them.
7. The seventh setback was caused by the experiences of the National Struggle. [20] Those who were struggling for national liberation encountered two main groups of enemies classified by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as internal and external enemies, which on the other hand were allied. External enemies were the foreigners who wished to subdue the national war of independence and dissolve Turkey, while the internal enemies were the Sultan, Palace officials, and the Bab?âli (the Ottoman government). Despite the numerous enemies, the Republic was finally proclaimed on 29 October 1923

5With the proclamation of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Pasha became its President, Fethi Bey the Chairman of the Assembly, while ?smet Pasha served as prime minister. Ismet Pasha also became the vice leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) which was established in 9 September 1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

6The main goals of the leaders of the Republic—drawn from the lessons of the past—were to remove the causes of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and to construct a national state based on stable foundations, constantly vigilant against internal and external enemies. National unity and integrity had to be ensured in order to achieve these goals. Consequently, the latest has been taken up by Kemalism—the protection of national unity and integrity, order and security, and thus, independence. [21]

7The founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, in his Great Speech delivered at the second convention of the Republican People’s Party in the large hall of the Turkish Grand National Assembly during 15-20 October 1927, highlighted the reasons for the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In the conclusion he stated that he entrusted the Turkish youth with the protection of the young Republic. A close analysis of the text of Atatürk, starting with him addressing the “Turkish Youth,” gives significant clues to understanding the founding philosophy of the Republic of Turkey.

8Atatürk described the difficulties before, during and after the National Struggle, including those that had arisen during his leadership, and he emphasised that the fight against internal and external enemies should not be sidestepped, if similar conditions reappear in the future. In order to prevent another failure, Atatürk and his associates, firstly ‘othered’ the Ottomans and constructed the new state and nation. The ‘ideal’ nation structure to aim for, according to them, was a national society which does not grant rights to those who live for contradictions, conflicts and social fights, dissolution and disintegration. The nation he aimed to create was not only going to be equal internationally, but also was not going to tolerate internal opposition. [22]

9In every social formation, there is a sovereign ideology and sovereign superstructure which leave their marks. They create the reality of this society and also reflect it to some extent. [23] Today, the ideas and principles, which were the basis of the foundation of the modern Turkish State and the execution of its general politics for a certain period, are named “Kemalism.” [24]Having been formed as the sovereign ideology of Turkish political identity, Kemalism became the reality and reflection of Turkish society/state. It had a role in the foundation of the new state on a scientific basis, and in the following years it achieved a hegemonic position.

10At the congress held in 1927, CHP was defined as a Republican, Nationalist, Populist political community and was stated that “The party considered the separation of religion and state in state and national affairs as one of the most important principles.” At the Third Great Congress which was held on 10-18 May 1931 the fundamental principles of the Republican People’s Party, clarified in the form of “6 Arrows,” were completed by including the principles of Etatism and Revolution in the CHP legislation and programme in addition to the principles of Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism and Secularism. [25]

11The six arrows were included in the Constitution with the constitutional amendment of 5 February 1937 and the Turkish State was identified as a republican, national, populist, etatist, secular and revolutionist state. This amendment meant that the absolute integration of the Republican People’s Party and the Turkish state was officially approved and Kemalist ideology was proclaimed as the official doctrine of the state. [26] The task of safeguarding the Kemalist state order belonged to the army, as Atatürk stated “The army which shall protect the glory and honour of Turkey and the Turkish community against all kinds of internal and external dangers…”[27]

12Today, everyone who has at least completed primary school, and even those who have not completed it, have memorised or understand the meaning of the address of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk starting with the address to the “Turkish Youth!” Moreover, students in primary school daily sing the “Student Oath” before starting lessons. [28] Young minds aim to be proud of and to love the nation they belong to. With the words glorifying their nation, they swear to walk incessantly toward the aims that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk set, on the path that he paved. It was made an obligation to include Atatürk’s portrait, the Turkish flag, the Independence March, Atatürk’s Address to the Youth, and a map of Turkey in every classroom as well as the Student Oath in primary school classrooms. [29] Textbooks in general have to include the Independence March, Atatürk’s picture, the Student Oath, Atatürk’s Address to the Youth as well as a map of Turkey and the Teacher March on the last page. The history, geography, social sciences and literature textbooks also have to include both, a map of Turkey and a world map. [30] Individuals have learned from childhood that they should fight against internal and external enemies and to take Atatürk as a reference. The institutions of the Republic gain strength from the periods of collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the unique struggle against the great powers, in which the Turks succeeded under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal thus, remembering Atatürk’s Address to Youth any time they encounter difficulties.

13In this sense we can talk about a Kemalist hegemony and a paradigm in the meaning defined by the famous Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci. Ideology, as the whole thought, discourse and practices which ensures reproduction and legitimisation of the sovereign political-economic-social relations order existing in a society, is legitimised and adopted in principle by individuals as a moral basis during the education process. Therefore citizens guarantee to obey and display loyalty to the existing order not on the basis of coercion but on the basis of consent, starting from childhood. [31] As in the case of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, Kemalism also maintains its sovereignty by being based on the consent of its allies while it establishes domination over its opponents/internal enemies.

14Kemalism has traditionally three main ‘Others’ which have acquired an order of priority both in terms of international circumstances and internal political events.

15As one of the leading Others of Kemalism, reactionarism came not from Islam, but from those who had conveyed Islam to us for centuries. In this framework, Islam was identified as an element of the (national) identity of modern Turks, reinterpreted ‘correctly,’ especially by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, as the most rational and reasonable religion in parallel with the modernising goal, and Islam was taken under control by formalising this interpretation. [32] However, considering religion as a belief system separated from state affairs and related only to the conscience of the individual could not resolve the problem. This is because Islam relies on the unity and intimacy of religion and the world, as well as the religion and the state. Under their policy, in order to establish the principle of secularism in a society in which the Islamic religion is dominant, religion should be controlled by the state and then the religious and state affairs should be carried out with separate rules. [33]

16The principle of Kemalist secularism was not based on separation of state and religion as generally understood; on the contrary, it tried to bring religion under the control of the state. Religious education was going to be provided by the state. The system of religious values adopted by the majority of people became the most effective ideological competitor of Kemalists, firstly in terms of political power and secondly with the fulfilment of the desired social reforms. Therefore, Kemalism conflicted with the feeling and thinking adopted by the people within the framework of its cultural and economic programme. [34] Islamists, who were traditionally opposed to modernisation, accused Kemalists of imitating the West and estranging society from Islam. However, they could not avoid being subjected to the dominance of the Kemalist state with this discourse and finally they were excluded from the system. A place was found for them in the system with AKP, which has the same line of argument but which left out the anti-Western discourse. With this strategic policy finally they returned in the elections of 3 November 2002 on more pragmatic terms.

17Rebel movements started in 1924 when the caliphate was abolished and the period of Atatürk’s rule had continuous Kurdish revolts and the counter-movements of the Republican army. [35] The Sheik Sait Revolt that erupted in 1924 constitutes a significant example which strengthens the perception that internal and external enemies acted together. The fanatics and sheiks, whose actual aims, based on religion, were in opposition to the revolution and the Republic, kept people in ignorance and maintained their own interests in order to achieve their aims. The traitor politicians who exploited the main disturbance and soft spots of this first group accompanied by the foreigners who exploited both these groups and were not even related to Islam, created a triple alliance of enemies. [36] The common fear stated in partially published secret reports of the Kemalist authorities was to be dismantled as the Ottoman Empire had been. The Kurdish question still continues to perpetuate the worries about the disintegration of Anatolia. The republican governments made Muslim ethnic groups, other than Kurds, familiar with Turkish culture and by means of Turkification policies, removed the possibility of them provoking instability, however, the Kurdish question is still an ongoing problem and it continue to be a cause for concern in Turkey, both in domestic and foreign policy issues.

18Fascism, Communism, Nazism or Socialism were basically criticised because they were perceived as systems that are not libertarian, include national domination and are not based on the people’s will. All these counter-ideologies were prohibited by the regime and what really mattered was Turkish nationalism in the sense that it “does not wish entrance and spread of non-national movements in the country.” This is because “our nationalism […] intimately loves all Turks regardless of their religion with a deep sense of brotherhood, wishes welfare and development for them and takes the borders of the Republic of Turkey as the borders for political engagement.” It was clearly stated that there is no place for different opinions and ideologies other than Turkish nationalism. [37] Having “sided with the democracies” after the Second World War, Turkey was not going to permit imitative ideologies in the legitimate political arena. [38]

19For example, two left-wing parties connected with the banned Turkish Communist Party, were shut down a short time after their establishment. [39]

20Further, having been established by separated groups from CHP, under the leadership of the last prime minister of Atatürk, Celal Bayar, in addition to Atatürk’s party CHP, the Democrat Party (DP) came into power when it won the elections on 14 May 1950. However, DP was accused of compromising the Kemalism principles and putting its Other into power thus it was overthrown by a military intervention.

21The socialists were deemed to be part of the concept of Other from the foundation of the Republic but remained in the background compared to reactionary and separatist movements. However, they became the greatest Other of Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s, after the Soviet Union emerged as a super power in the post-Second World War period and became the greatest Other of the West. In its attempt to be seen as a Western country, Turkey started to shape the domestic and foreign policy according to the threats coming from this Other. On the other hand, Socialists defend the existence of the Kurdish people and their rights, as well as the recognition of their right to receive education in their native language.

22Although there was a possibility of establishing the government again in 1978, CHP and its leader Bülent Ecevit could not get the necessary support from the Kemalist state and more specifically from the army as the inheritor of the Kemalist revolution. Being positioned left of the centre, CHP also became one of the Others of the Kemalist state during this period. The army intervened once again on 12 September 1980 and it started to shape the conditions which would give rise to a reactionary movement, while the vital ‘lifeblood’ of the socialists, who were mythologized as the greatest externally supported Other, and the left in general, were cut off in this period. Thus, the reactionary movement and concomitant divisiveness, or Kurdish separatism, became the greatest externally supported internal enemies of Kemalism to the equal extent in the 1990s and, to a greater extent, in the 2000s.

23Certain significant reforms were made in the direction of democratisation during the period 1999-2002 in Turkey, as a result of its status of an official candidate for membership in the European Union 1999. These reforms are in short as follows: the rewriting of one-third of the Turkish constitution, the enactment of international human rights legislation, the end of capital punishment, the expansion of women’s rights, measures to discourage torture and to improve prison conditions, and new laws curtailing restrictions on freedom of expression, civil society, and the media. [40] In addition to this, two large earthquakes occurred in one of the most densely populated and industrialised zones of Turkey during the coalition government of Democratict Left Party (DSP)-Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)-Motherland Party (ANAP) on 17 August and 12 November 1999 which led to hundreds of thousands of people ending up homeless and the loss of more than 20,000 lives. When a serious tax loss emerged, the government tried to increase its revenues via additional taxes. Moreover, serious economic crises were suffered in Turkey in 1999 and 2001. Particularly, the 19 February 2001 crisis had an enormous impact. The economic structure and the markets turned upside down, the interest rates increased excessively, the Istanbul Stock Exchange almost collapsed, and the banks recalled their credits. When Turkish liras excessively depreciated, people turned to the American dollar, and the foreign currency reserves of the Central Bank ran out. In those circumstances even the craftsmen, who did not have an activist tradition at all, started to protest.

24The World Bank vice-chairman, Kemal Dervi?, was sent to Turkey on a rescue mission, took over the administration of the economy and declared his 3-stage rescue plan on 14 March 2001.

25The heavy economic crises and the loss of prestige of the leading political parties which have been included in the coalition governments, led Turkish people to become oriented towards new political actors.

26Having established the Justice and Development Party (AKP) on 14 August 2001, Recep Tayyip Erdo?an immediately sought acceptance for himself. The World Economic Forum, traditionally held in Davos in Switzerland every year, after the attacks of 11 September 2001 exceptionally was held in New York between 31 January and 4 February 2002. AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdo?an and his Deputy, Abdullah Gül, were invited that year to the Davos meetings in addition to the State Minister, Kemal Dervi?, and the Foreign Minister, ?smail Cem.

27Erdo?an complained about the fact that AKP is perceived abroad as incorrect and said that “We are neither the successor of any party nor a religion-based political party.” Erdo?an stated in his speech at the CSIS (Center of Strategic and International Studies) that “they deemed the global responsibilities of the USA as legitimate.” Having pacified the Americans by stating that “Iran may not export its regime to Turkey,” Erdo?an told the attendees of the Davos Summit and “his US friends” that “we are not religious oriented but human oriented” and stated that he considered secularism included an assurance of tolerance for all religions in Turkey; then he added “Our American friends can see that our party is far from radical.” [41]

28The new strategy of the USA over its fight against terrorism as a result of the 11 September 2001 attacks created a new international situation. The Turkish Armed Forces were uncomfortable about the policies of the USA towards Iraq and its possible influence, especially on Kurdish separatism in Turkey. On the other hand, the USA developed a ‘moderate Islam’ model, which removed the conditions for the formation of radical Islamist terrorists and created some follow-up policies. According to this understanding, the dictators in the Middle East had created an environment for the development of radical Islamists with their harsh attitudes towards Islam. On the other hand, the rigid understanding of secularism of the Kemalist regime in Turkey had radicalised Islamists and made them anti-Western. Having cast a model role for Turkey, the USA believed that the ‘moderate Islamist’ government in Turkey might constitute an example for other Middle East countries.

29The Kemalist state order did not allow political Islamists to penetrate the state institutions in Turkey. The political Islamist parties were closed by the Constitutional Court decisions. The Western allies of Turkey avoided standing by the political Islamists parties due to their anti-Western discourses. However, some segment of the Turkish political Islamists had sought to change their anti-Western discourses. This change of discourse has coincided with a period when the USA has started to support moderate Islamists movements against radical Islam. Turkish political Islamists sought support from the USA and EU against the internal Kemalist regime by promising democracy, human rights and harmonisation.

Suavi Ayd N Task N Tr Tarihi Pdf Format

30Hence, AKP has arisen as a ‘moderate Islamist’ political actor and achieved at the 3 November 2002 elections a victory which was an outcome of before mentioned extraordinary conditions.

31Only the Justice and Development Party (AKP), established a short time before the elections, which gained 34% of the votes, and the Republican People’s Party, which gained 19%, entered Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) as a result of the general elections of 3 November 2002. A leader from the political Islamist tradition, who declared that they had changed, dominated TGNA alone and established a government with a sufficient number of deputies to amend the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey for the first time in Turkish history. In spite of all the criticisms and conflicts with the Kemalist regime, AKP acquired almost 47% of the votes in the elections held on 22 July 2007 and established a government again. One of the leading names in the Party, Abdullah Gül, was elected as the President of the Republic.

32During the latest elections held on 12 June 2011, CHP gained 21% and MHP got 14% of the votes. AKP has arisen with 48.83%, CHP with 25.98% and MHP with 13.01% of the votes. AKP won the elections once again and established a government once more.

33Turkey has always been a conservative country, and the vast majority of Turks have traditionally voted for centre-right parties. [42] The parties positioned on the centre right and further right have acquired about 60-65% of total votes since 1946, when Turkey entered into the multi-party period. These votes were mostly shared between ANAP and Dogru Yol Partisi (Turkish: True Path Party) (DYP)in the 1980s and 1990s and it seem to have switched to AKP in the 2002 elections. ANAP and DYP were gradually reduced and almost disappeared from the political stage during the course of power of AKP. This situation benefited AKP. Beyond this, AKP even tries to prevent the formation of any party which may be an alternative to itself. It conducts itself, in some sense, as if it were an empire. For this reason, not only election results but also the processes of shaping the political structure should be taken into account.

34The centre-right DYP, whose leader, Tansu Çiller, became Turkey’s first female prime minister, from 1993 to 1996, obtained just 0.15% of the votes. The centre-left DSP, whose leader Bülent Ecevit was one of Turkish most distinguished post-war premiers and, most recently, prime minister from 1999 to 2002, gained just 0.25% of the votes. The centre-right Motherland Party (ANAP), which featured in coalition governments in Turkey for much of the 1990s, has long-since ceased to exist. [43] As this makes clear, the centre right parties which had governed Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s have dissolved; the DSP, positioned on the centre left, has lost significance in terms of political power; CHP and MHP, positioned on a Turkist/Islamist line but in general reconciled with Kemalism, still continue their opposition to AKP. Another important party which sustains the opposition line, which was characterised by Erdo?an as “the party extension of the terrorist organisation,” “the party doing politics on ethnic identity” [44] is BDP (Peace and Democracy Party). The pro-Kurdish nationalist Peace and Democracy Party was also a major winner; its members running as independents managed to get around a 10% electoral threshold rule that was largely designed to keep them out. [45]

35Another example is the conspiracies organised against CHP and MHP. A sex video of the charismatic leader of CHP, who has been in politics since 1970, and his former principal clerk and a deputy of the time was broadcast on the internet on 10 May 2010 and the leader of CHP had to resign from his office. However, CHP has continued its strong opposition without any problem under the leadership of Kemal K?l?çdaro?lu. Sex videos of ten members of MHP, the other strong opposition party of the Assembly, including its deputy leaders and deputy candidates, were also broadcast on the internet in May 2011 with short intervals. The leader of MHP, Devlet Bahçeli, asked the involved party members to resign their office and in this way, he managed to prevent the attrition campaign against MHP. MHP fulfilled the condition of taking at least 10% of the votes cast, throughout the country, as a legal condition to be represented in TGNA. If MHP had fallen below the 10% election threshold and could not be represented in TGNA, AKP would have obtained the power to unilaterally change the Turkish constitution without seeking reconciliation with other parties by means of the number of deputies it would have acquired in TGNA.

36Recep Tayyip Erdo?an started his visits to EU member countries after the 3 November 2002 elections. The fact that after being politically banned in Turkey, he was welcomed as a prime minister by EU member states and the USA was attributed to the fact that Western countries “well know what democracy is.” [46] This case was explained by EU member states as abiding by the “election results in Turkey”, “preference of Turkish people” and thus “respect for democracy,” this being a result of the democratic culture of Europe. Erdo?an was mythologized as a person who garners respect, since he “struggles for democracy”, and as a “banned” leader whose personal existence makes “necessary” Turkey’s membership of the EU. [47]

37Erdo?an visited the USA and was welcomed by President George William Bush as “the new leader of Turkey.” The Republic of Turkey’s ambassador as representative of the Turkish state and other embassy officers were not included in the meeting held between President Bush and Erdo?an. [48]

38During his visit in 2004 Bush met Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo?an in the Official Prime Minister’s Residence first, instead of the President of the Republic, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who was his official host according to diplomatic custom. Moreover, Bush went to the Official Prime Minister’s Residence instead of hosting Erdo?an in his hotel, even though he was, according to the protocol, in a higher position. Afterwards, Bush visited Anitkabir (Atatürk’s Mausoleum) where the grave of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is located having a symbolic and significant meaning for Turkish people. Then, Bush was accepted by the ‘host’ President of the Republic, Ahmet Necdet Sezer. While he met privately with Sezer just for a period of half an hour, he spent one hour for his bilateral meeting with Erdo?an. These gestures by President Bush towards Erdo?an were an indication of the support given by the USA to him. [49]

39‘The address to the youth’ of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was frequently remembered during the years when the government established by AKP were acquiring external support from the US and European Union. It has been argued that state bodies which exercise power in the name of the nation as well as the society must sustain the Republic values in order to protect the principles of the revolution of Atatürk.

40The Supreme Court of Appeals Prosecutor’s Office also opened a dissolution case against AKP on 14 March 2008, and ten members of the Constitutional Court, except Ha?im K?l?ç who was the Islamist original Chairman of the Constitutional Court, reached a consensus on the issue that “AKP had become the focus of antisecular actions.” In the judgement made on 1 August 2008, 6 members, including the proxy chairman Osman Paksüt, voted to close it for violating the country’s secular principles, but seven were required. Subsequently, AKP was not dissolved and continued to administer the country.

41After this decision the process of penetration of AKP governments into state institutions gained speed. On the other hand, the advocates of the Kemalist state criticized Islamist government policies by frequently referring to ‘Kemalist’ principles and symbols in their speeches.

42Ergenekon and Balyoz’s (Hammer) investigations and cases have left a strong mark in Turkey. The Ergenekon Operation started when 27 hand grenades, TNT moulds and igniters were seized in a shanty house in Ümraniye on 12 June 2007. Journalists, authors, academics, university rectors, retired and active army staff/officers who were known to be nationalist/Kemalist and opposed to AKP were detained and humiliated before the public with the operations carried out in the small hours on different dates with a psychological war waged through the various media channels. These people went to trial on 20 October 2008 accused of such offences as “being a member of an armed terrorist organisation,” “helping armed terrorist organisations,” “attempting to destroy the Republic of Turkey or preventing it from performing its duties by use of force and violence,” “provoking an armed rebellion against the Republic of Turkey’s government,” “possessing and dropping explosive materials and instigating these offences,” “instigating the Council of State attack and dropping explosive material on the newspaper Cumhuriyet offices,” “procuring secret documents and recording private data related to the safety of the state,” “encouraging military disobedience,” “clearly provoking people to revenge and hostility” and similar offences. The private lives of many of the defendants were disclosed by journalists who received information from the case files and used them. The investigation was derailed and an attempt was made to shift it to other lines, consciously or unconsciously. [50] One of the suspects of the case (out of 275 suspects in total, 67 of whom were imprisoned) was the former Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, ?lker Ba?bu?. Ba?bu? was imprisoned on 6 January 2012 with the judgement of “being the director of an armed terrorist organisation and attempting to abolish the Republic of Turkey government or partially or completely prohibiting it from performing its duties by use of coercion and violence.”

43The ‘Balyoz Plan’ case involved 365 suspects, of which 250 were imprisoned from 16 December 2010, while the court made a judgement on 21 September 2012. 330 suspects, including former naval and air force commanders and the First Army Commander were sentenced to imprisonment by a court judgement.

44The court sentenced 3 former commanders to aggravated life imprisonment for the offence of “compulsory annulment of the council of ministers of the Republic of Turkey or compulsorily prohibiting them from performing their tasks.” Having taken into consideration that the result was beyond the control and expectations of the suspects and their original intention and reasons, and their objective, the court converted the aggravated life imprisonment into 20 years imprisonment for each of the suspects. The court sentenced 78 suspects to imprisonment for 18 years, 218 suspects to 16 years, 1 suspect to 15 years, and 28 suspects to 13 years and 4 months imprisonment for the same offence. [51]

45The former Air Force commander ?brahim F?rt?na, who was condemned to 20 years of imprisonment after the ‘Balyoz Plan,’ has stated that “the Turkish Republic and state should draw a lesson from this.” As one of the outstanding Others of the Kemalist state, political Islamists arrested, judged and imprisoned the advocators and protectors of the Kemalist state using controversial types of evidence which fitted with the ideals of Islamist rule. This was a situation in which the Kemalist state showed weakness in protecting itself.

46Having served as the member of the European Court of Human Rights during the period 1998-2008 and elected as a deputy of CHP in the 2011 elections, R?za Türmen characterised the Balyoz decision as a “show judgement” and said that “the aim of these cases is to threaten. We see the examples of such judgments in such cases as Dreyfus, Sacco and Vanzetti, and in the crackdown on armed insurgency applied by Stalin in Eastern Europe.” Türmen said as follows regarding the idea that the judgement may be reversed in the Court of Appeal: “The result is certainly a show judgement. The first act of the theatre was completed; the Court of Appeal will constitute the second act. The result will not change. Does the Court of Appeal have the bold courage to say that a fair trial was not performed? This is impossible in the current atmosphere.” He also pointed out that Islamist and Fethullah proponent representatives also exercised control over the Court of Appeal. [52]

47As a defence attorney, Celal Ülgen made the following evaluation: “The normal judgement process will never be operated in Turkey. The courts with special powers operate as if they are counter-revolutionary courts. Expecting a positive result from these courts and the Court of Appeal to investigate the decision is a simple-minded expectation. Unless the judicial body is independent and the normal rule of law is established again, it would not be right to cherish this hope.”

48Investigations about the period, which concluded with the decisions made by the National Security Council and then the closure of the Islamist Welfare Party on 28 February 1997, were started this time in April 2012. In addition to the officers of the time, YÖK (Higher Education Council) Chairman Prof Dr Kemal Gürüz was also imprisoned as a result of the 28 February 1997 investigation. The Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces on 28 February, ?smail Hakk? Karaday?, was brought to the public prosecution office from Istanbul to Ankara by police on 3 January 2013 and it was decided to try him without a formal charge. A number of military staff were also committed to prison by reason of the 28 February decisions, under a decision of National Security Council and signed by the government of the time.

49The Armed Forces were weakened by the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases and along with them the psychological tactics executed by media supporters of AKP. The Economist journal said that the trial and imprisonment of those who had attempted a coup against the elected government may be considered as a victory for Turkish democracy. Erdo?an may think that he has completely taken the army under his control. The National Security Council, through which the generals used to bark orders to nominally civilian governments, has been reduced to a symbolic role. After constitutional reforms were approved in a 2010 referendum, soldiers began to be tried in civilian courts. “Erdogan sees the army as his boys,” comments Henri Barkey, a professor of international relations at Lehigh University in Pennsylvania. [53] However, the army depending on Kemalist traditions has probably applied a tactical shift, not wanting to seem as if it is in conflict with the Islamist AKP government in public opinion.

50The US Ambassador to Ankara, Francis Ricciardone, said in a statement he made to journalists on 4 February 2013 that the arrested deputies, professors and commanders are in prison “without knowing what they are accused of” and the accusations about them “could not be completely understood.” The ambassador rigorously criticised the executions in the cases of Ergenekon and Balyoz by saying “There are deputies who have been in prison for a long period, and some of them have been jailed for dubious offences. The military leaders who were charged to safeguard the country are in prison, as if they are terrorists…” [54]

51These cases initially gave Turkey great prestige in the European Union, and were regarded as important in terms of correcting civil-military relations. However, the illegal treatments during the hearing procedures, the prohibition of a book not even printed, and keeping the journalists in prison started to cause a change in this point of view. [55]

52The most significant characteristic of the period after AKP came to power in 3 November2002 elections, was that a counter-hegemonic power along with the Gramscian model, which acquired a place for itself in the state mechanism and in society, rose against the Kemalist hegemony for the first time. It is to be noted that one of the most important objectives of the counter-hegemonic power is the Turkish Armed Forces as the most significant inheritor and sustaining power of the Kemalist regime. The commander of the Turkish Armed Forces of the time, ?lker Ba?bu?, stated in the press release he delivered on 26 June 2009 that “I think the mythologized events recently considered as increasingly carried out in an organised way were turned into an attrition and defamation campaign against TSK” and “an asymmetric psychological movement was carried out against TSK by means of the media,” he also added “please put an end to this situation.” [56] Even though he did not clearly state who is carrying out the asymmetric psychological movement against TSK by means of the media, it was not just TSK which was subjected to the asymmetric psychological movement.

53The President of the Republic, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, [57] had been the target of the Islamist press from the start of his taking up office. The AKP government and ideology has never got along with President Sezer. As someone who has internalised the constitutional order and practices of the Kemalist state, Sezer was the most important obstacle to the AKP government’s influence on the institutions of the Republic. Özdemir ?nce said in an article in 2005 that the order of Turkey would be disrupted in the absence of the President of the Republic, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, and may even lead to a conflict, and predicted that “A ‘President of Republic from AKP’ instead of Sezer would be a disaster for Turkey.” [58]

54Thus, once Abdullah Gül became the President of the Republic after the expiration of Sezer’s term, the Islamist offices and appointments gained momentum in the Higher Education Council (YÖK), Constitutional Court, Court of Appeal, Council of State, National Intelligence Organisation, Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (HSYK) and in the ministries. The journalists who opposed AKP in the newspapers and the central media who did not support AKP, started to be dismissed. This is because the owners of newspapers do not only engage in media activities but they also engage in different sectors such as energy, mining, textile, finance, transportation, industry, commerce and tourism in addition to media activities. For this reason, they must have good relation with the governments in order to carry out their activities and benefit from the biddings regulated by the state institutions. AKP governments have exploited the state institutions they had penetrated, such as tax experts being an element of oppression against the media bosses. [59]

55Opposition mayors were audited by inspectors sent by the Ministry of Internal Affairs over a long time, and subjected to police raids together with the supporting media. The supporters of the constitutional order created by the Kemalist state were oppressed with psychological warfare supported by the supporting media. While the AKP has ‘democratized’ Turkey by means of ‘reforms’ with the support of the EU, and the USA in particular, they have gained some influence against the institutions of the Kemalist state and have started to target TSK members, who could possibly be the most important obstacle against them.

56The constitution amendments opposed by CHP and MHP and which changed the structure of supreme judicial bodies, were accepted in the plebiscite held on 12 September 2012 with a 57.88% pro vote by the people, due to the provisions acceptable to all parties made by AKP in the general amendments. AKP argued that the amendments were made in order to provide greater democracy and law.

57Certain significant changes were made in the structure of the Constitutional Court and HSYK with the amendments to the constitution. Some comments have been made regarding whether the Kemalist state bodies, which are the sustainers of the constitutional order, are now being substantially controlled by the Islamist AKP and Fethullah supporters as an Islamist order now supports AKP as a result of the constitutional changes. [60]

58The number of Court of Appeal members was increased from 250 to 387 and the number of Council of State members was increased from 95 to 156 by an amendment to the law made in February 2011. In this way, two bodies of the Kemalist state were also penetrated by the Islamist Government and Fethullah supporters. [61] Mehmet Ali Birand said that we are faced with a pitched battle and power struggle and added that “external observers are unable to understand this. They try to clarify and understand how a political government, which administers a country, could enter into such a great fight with its own judicial system. However, it is difficult to understand. Because a system is changing or the world’s view on it is trying to be changed.” [62] Birand emphasizes that the ‘Kemalist’ state order has adopted some changes with regard to these statements. Also, he states that the AKP government has tried to construct an Islamist world-view instead of a foundation philosophy of the state based on ‘Kemalist’ principles and values.

59The evaluation of Ru?en Çak?r as one of the journalists who knows and investigates the Islamic tradition in Turkey naming Recep Tayyip Erdo?an and AKP as reformist/moderate Islamists is very interesting. According to Çak?r, there are significant differences in terms of discourse between the political line of the National Vision movement that represents the anti-Western Islamist tradition of Turkey and its leader Necmettin Erbakan, and Erdo?an, presented as reformist (but the reformists are ideologically Islamist to a greater extent). Çak?r said that “Some people suppose reformism is Islamist to a lesser extent. But, reformism is Islamist to a greater extent ideologically. Traditionalists position themselves at the centre of the world and wished to see the other Islamic movements of the world under their own roof. On the other hand the reformists were not closer to secularism; on the contrary they were more rigidly Islamist, but they used modern methods. They wished to balance the lack of national legitimacy with international legitimacy by saying that ‘We have a problem of legitimacy before the system, regardless of the number of votes we could acquire in Turkey’ (especially after the closure of the Welfare and Felicity Parties). They made the greatest separation from the Hoca (Necmettin Erbakan) by separating from the discourses of the ‘Christian Club.’ They established very good relations with the European Union, USA and even Israel. A military coup was not made during the AKP rule because of such legitimacy.” [63]

60It may be stated that traditionally anti-Western Muslim Brothers organisations existing in the countries where the “Arab Spring” is being experienced also started to apply modern methods similar to AKP. In the past few years, instead of calling for an Islamic state, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood began calling for a civil, democratic state with an Islamic reference, suggesting a new-found commitment to the separation of mosque and state (although not of religion and politics). This move seems to have been deliberately aimed, at least in part, at alleviating international fears, with the goal of improving its image; moreover, the group launched an internal initiative in 2005 called Reintroducing the Brotherhood to the West. [64] Muslim Brothers do not recognise the right of Israel to exist. They consider Hamas not as a terrorist organisation but a resistance organisation. Moreover, mainstream Islamist groups are surprisingly sensitive to international opinion. They remember the outcry that followed Islamist electoral victories in Algeria in 1991 and the Palestinian territories in 2006 and know that a great deal is at stake—hundreds of millions of dollars of Western assistance, loans from international financial institutions, and trade and investment. Islamists are well aware that getting tied up in controversial foreign policy efforts would cause the international community to withdraw support from the new democracies, thus undermining the prospects for a successful transition. [65] Thus, it is clear that the support provided by the USA and EU member countries was a determinant in the success of the “Arab Spring” rebellions. The Western media idealised the ‘revolutions’ in the Middle East and reported them as a process by which the authoritarian regimes would be destroyed and replaced by liberal democracies. However, having sought for legitimacy like AKP and probably inspired by AKP in order to achieve their pragmatic objectives, Islamists will remove the conditions for the existence of a liberal democracy and politically continue to be the sustainers of their historical past once they achieve power.

61The indications that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo?an wishes to place Turkey on an Islamist basis in the future are increasing. He said in a speech on 19 January 2013: “We said ‘single nation,’ ‘single flag,’ ‘single country,’ and ‘single state.’ We said ‘no’ to ethnic nationalism. We embraced everyone: Turk, Kurd, Laz, Abkhas, Cherkess, Georgian, Roman. We love the created for the Creator’s sake. Could we say that Turk has a sin, or Kurd has a sin? Individuals do not decide to be Turk, Kurd, Las, Bosnian or Georgian. The Creator decides this.”[66] He also said in another speech on 20 January 2013 “…Those who act as if they are nationalist tried to hinder us, but that they could not achieve this and would never achieve this. Those who support the extension of nationalists should expect nothing from us, they could not find. I emphasise this. We are the representative of millet [nation]. You have drawn our route. We will continue to walk on this route…”[67] In addition, it is seen that he does not imply an ulus (nation) in the Western meaning, but with the concept of millet he implies a society in which Muslims from different ethnic groups live together, when it is taken into account that Erdo?an is the carrier of an identity that perceives the world within the framework of Islamist values. [68]

62Erdo?an stated that Turkey is located in a region where great fluctuations were experienced during the course of history and these fluctuations still continue at full speed. According to Erdo?an, the West does not wish for the existence of a powerful Turkey being uncertain about what it should do if Turkey becomes more powerful. In addition to the anti-Western discourses of Erdo?an, which arise occasionally, increasing disruption in the relations between Israel and Turkey to the extent of a crisis, the relations established by Erdo?an with Hamas, which is considered to be a terrorist organisation by Western countries, and the relations developed with Syria and Iran in the last term, his efforts to undertake a significant role in the countries which experienced the “Arab Spring” lead to Israel and Western countries worrying about the issue of the orientation and consistency of Turkish foreign policy. Thus, Erdo?an pointed out the interest area of Turkey’s foreign policy, which is shaped on the Islamic identity in some way, in the speech he made after the June 12 elections. The Turkish Prime Minister’s victory speech in June 2011, saluting “all friendly and brotherly nations from Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, Sarajevo, Baku and Nicosia”, was seen by many observers as the speech of a “Middle Eastern” rather than European leader. [69] It is understood that Erdo?an has an approach which overlaps with the conceptualisation of the Foreign Minister Ahmet Davuto?lu. He promotes a doctrine of “strategic depth” invoking Turkey’s long history and position at the crossroads of the Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Black Sea. [70]

63The speech made by Erdo?an to the deputies of his party on the issue of the “turban,” which has become the symbol of the power struggle between the Kemalist state and Islamists since the 1990s, gives a clue about AKP’s strategy of Islamising the Kemalist state. Erdo?an said in his speech that the “Headscarf issue[71]is a matter of patience. It took 23 years for even the Koran to be revealed. Alcoholic beverages were even prohibited gradually at that time.” Having separated the “physical situation” and the “legal situation”, Erdo?an spoke about the necessity of making society ready. Having stressed that it takes nine months for a baby to be born, Erdo?an followed with “A baby may be disabled in case of a premature birth. The important thing is the health of the baby. Headscarf is a right, an inborn right.” [72] in another speech he said that they are making a “silent revolution.”

64The Constitution Conciliation Commission, which was established by the participation of the four parties represented in TGNA after the 12 June 2011 elections, and directed to prepare a completely new constitution for Turkey, still continues its work. As is known, constitutions of countries reflect the philosophy/world view/ideology of the constitution makers and institutions of the state and social order are shaped by its constitution. Laws and other explanatory documents come from the constitution. The philosophy/world view/ideology integrated in the new constitution will determine the future of Kemalist hegemony in Turkey. A constitution shaped by AKP will reflect ‘moderate Islamist’ world view and a possible end of the Kemalist hegemony.

65Some have argued that Erdo?an wishes to impose Islam as a super identity on the Muslim ethnic identities like Turk, Kurd, Laz, Cherkess. [73] One does not have to be an oracle to foresee that there is a desire to shape the new constitution in the nature of a “millet” constitution, in which Turks and Kurds would be the main elements with the common ground of Islamic identity. While the negotiations were still ongoing over the issue of a new constitution, the discourses of Erdo?an about a transition to the presidential system started to acquire currency. Having promised that the new constitution will be arranged around the parliamentary system in the 2007 Election Declaration, AKP started to propose the presidential system.

66AKP has carried out a gradual strategy over time in order to capture the Kemalist state by means of the “legitimacy” it gained both in the eyes of the USA and in the context of EU member countries. Morton Abramowitz and Henri J. Barkey expressed their opinions as follows: “The AKP has a unique opportunity to change Turkish society, change the country’s constitution and its archaic political system, and make peace with both its neighbours and its own people. It seems ready to seize it. But it needs assistance. The West should not act as if Turkey is moving in the right direction in all respects, but it can help keep Turkey on track to becoming a tolerant liberal democracy.” [74] However, they must have noticed that those whose minds have been shaped by religious dogmas are strangers to a democratic political ideology, which is the product of the modern era and which emerged as a result of a historical process and experiences.

67Political Islamists have tried to obstruct all kinds of steps taken by the Ottoman Empire and Turkey in the direction of its historical experience and modernisation, for centuries. Turkish Kemalists and increasingly other wide segments of the society are becoming aware of the Islamisation and concomitantly authoritarianism of the state. They started to experience it in their daily lives, on the streets and in their workplaces. The historical dynamics of Turkey and the changes occurring in the international structure, as well as the fact that the internal structure of Turkey is increasingly becoming authoritarian and brought under the control of Islamist mobilised oppositional dynamics. Kemalist hegemony is proceeding towards a situation in which it may reproduce itself in a more powerful way. AKP will probably lose its position in the Turkish political system as an interim period party. If we reach a conclusion based on a Kemalist perception, the greatest externally supported ‘internal enemy’ of Turkey is nearing its end.

68Individuals of the society who have learned that they should struggle against internal and external enemies—and who have taken Atatürk and the institutions of the Republic as a reference point from childhood—take strength from the painful memories of the periods of collapse of the Ottomans and the unique struggle against the Great Powers which eventually succeeded under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. Thus, Kemalizm may be continuously reproduced as an ideology and Turkish society may perceive reality in terms of this ideology.

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69An attempt has been made to try to ensure a correspondence between the choices of the official ideology and national identity. However, it should not also be supposed that the ideological discourse inculcated into children or young people or the attempt at legitimising values are completely adopted or embraced by all individuals of the society. This is because all individuals of the society do not totally adopt the ideological transmissions of the state or may be oriented in the direction of discourses that oppose the official ideology. In this way, the hegemonic process may bring about a counter-hegemony within the hegemonic process.

70AKP has attempted to construct a counter-hegemonic power since 2002, when it came into power in Turkey. It found some allies in the civil society, business world, media, academic community, and encouraged its allies to create a legitimate ground for it by exploiting the possibilities of power while it tried to suppress any group which opposed it. It convinced the USA and EU member countries that it could establish an alliance with them by using a political discourse which disowned the Kemalist state. Moreover, it installed its allied Islamist/sectarian supporters on top-level, decision-making positions in the state institutions, and by means of its dominant position, especially in the police organisation, intelligence organisation, prosecutors and judges it imposed punishments on some segments of the society, which believed in democracy and the democratic order.

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71AKP demonstrated the capability of eliminating opposition once it had gradually penetrated the Kemalist state institutions and once it believed its power had reached sufficient strength. Having supported AKP during the first years of its power, the intellectuals, media groups, academicians and different segments of the society accept now that a process of islamisation is being implemented. Thus, Recep Tayyip Erdo?an declared that they made a “silent revolution.”

72However, it may be stated that AKP and similar parties would not make permanent changes in the Kemalist state structure when considered from a historical perspective. The Islamist AKP and similar Others (from the viewpoint of the Kemalist ideology) may function merely as interim period parties in the democratic system. This is because the historical experience and social dynamics verify the Kemalist ideology and its practices. This situation enables the Kemalist state structure and its dynamics to provide permanency and to bring them into re-existence in a powerful way.

• [1]
  Mustafa Ayd?n, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs”, Middle Eastern Studies, C.35, No. 4 (October 1999), 157.
• [2]
  For the full text of Kânûn-i Esâsî, see Suna Kili and ?eref Gözübüyük. Türk Anayasa Metinleri (Turkish Constitution Texts), 2nd Edition. Istanbul: Türkiye I? Bankas? Kültür Publications, May 2000, 43-55.
• [3]
  See Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazd?m: Millî Mücadeleye Gidi? (I have also Written: Transition to the National Struggle), Volume 3. Istanbul: Sabah Books, 1997, 60.
• [4]
  The ?ttihad-? Osmani Cemiyeti (Committee of the Ottoman Union) (then renamed as the Committee of Union and Progress (CUT)), which had been established by military medical school students in Istanbul in 1889 aimed to return the Kânûn-i Esâsî (the First Constitution of the Ottoman), which had been proclaimed in 1876 but sustained as a result of the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian war and parliament. The committee grew very slowly during the following few years. Some members of the committee avoided arrest by escaping abroad, mostly to Paris. Those who escaped abroad founded a small community composed of refugee Ottoman constitutionalists in Paris. They also established a small committee named the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). See Eric Jan Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, translated into Turkish by Yasemin Saner Gonen, 9^th Edition. Istanbul: ?leti?im Publishing House, 2000, 131.
• [5]
  M. Ça?atay Okutan. Tek Parti Döneminde Az?nl?k Politikalar? (Minority Policies in the Single Party Period), 1^st Edition. Istanbul: Bilgi University Publications, June 2004, 51-52.
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  For the Articles of the Berlin Treaty, see Tevfik B?y?kl?o?lu. Trakya’da Milî Mücadele (National Struggle in Thrace), Volume 1, 3^rd Edition. Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Publications, 1992, 35-40.
• [7]
  ?smet ?nönü. Hat?ralar (Memories). Prepared for publication by Sabahattin Selek, Book 1, 1^st Edition. Ankara: Bilgi Publishin House, October 1985, 47.
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  Hüsamettin Ertürk. ?ki Devrin Perde Arkas? (Background of Two Eras). Prepared by Samih Nafiz Tansu, First Edition. Istanbul: Sebil Publishing House, 1996, 35.
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  Falih R?fk? Atay. Çankaya. Istanbul: Pozitif Publications, 2004, 60.
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  Tar?k Zafer Tunaya. Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler (Political Parties in Turkey), Volume 1, 1^st Edition. Istanbul: ?leti?im Publications, 1998, 219.
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  Halil Mente?e. Halil Mente?e’nin An?lar? (Memories of Halil Mente?e), 1st Edition. Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakf? Publications, November 1986, 24.
• [13]
  See Talât Pa?a. Talat Pa?a’n?n An?lar? (Memories of Talat Pasha). Prepared by Alpay Kabacal?, 1^st Edition. Istanbul: Türkiye ?? Bankas? Kültür Publications, February 2000, 25.
• [14]
  Rumelia was a historical term referring to the lands conquered by the Ottomans from the Byzantine Empire.
• [15]
  Ahmet Halaço?lu. Balkans Harbi S?ras?nda Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri (Turkish Immigrations from Rumelia during the Balkans Wars, 1912-1913). 2^nd Edition. Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Publications, 1995, 16.
• [17]
  See Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Söylev (The Great Speech). Prepared for publication by H?fz? Veldet Velidedeo?lu, 35^th Edition. Istanbul: Ça?da? Publications, September 2000, 404.
• [18]
  See Talât Pa?a, Talat Pa?a’n?n An?lar? (Memories of Talat Pasha), 38.
• [19]
  Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler (Political Parties in Turkey), Volume 1, 36.
• [21]
  See Levent Köker. Modernle?me, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi (Modernisation, Kemalism and Democracy), 9^th Edition. Istanbul: ?leti?im Publications, 2005, 159.
• [22]
  See ?evket Süreyya Aydemir. Ink?lâp ve Kadro (the Revolution and Cadre), 5th Edition. Istanbul: Remzi Publishing House, Temmuz, 2003, 156-157.
• [23]
  Taner Timur. Osmanl? Kimli?i (Ottoman Identity), 3^rd Edition. Ankara: ?mge Publishing House, March 1998, 9.
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  Taner Timur. Türk Devrimi ve Sonras? (Turkish Revolution and the Subsequent Period), 5^th Edition. Ankara: ?mge Publishing House, January 2001, 108.
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  See Sina Ak?in et al. Türkiye Tarihi (History of Turkey) 1908-1980, C. IV. Istanbul: Cem Publishing House, 1995, 113.
• [26]
  ?smail Kaplan. Türkiye’de Milli E?itim ?deolojisi (National Education Ideology in Turkey), 3^rd Edition. Istanbul: ?leti?im Publications, 2002, 180.
• [27]
  See Cemil Koçak. Türkiye’de Milli ?ef Dönemi (The Period of National Chiefs in Turkey) 1938-1945, Volume 1, 2^nd Edition. Istanbul: ?leti?im Publications, 2003, 113.
• [28]
  See Kaplan, 354. “The Student Oath” text is as follows:

  My principle is to protect the younger to respect the elder,

  to love my homeland and my nation more than myself.

  My ideal is to rise, to progress. Oh Great Atatürk!

  On the path that you have paved, I swear to walk incessantly towards the aims that you have set.

  My existence shall be dedicated to the Turkish existence.
• [29]
  See Kaplan, 354.
• [30]
  See Kaplan, 356. “The Teachers Oath” was written by ?smail Hikmet Ertaylan. “The Teachers Oath” announces that there is and would be no nation equivalent with Turkish nation. The first quatrain of the March is as follow:
  “We wear a wreath full of knowledge, As Turkish young people desirous of enlightenment.
  There is no nation equivalent with Turkish nation in the world; Our ancestry does not know the meaning of the word fear.”
• [31]
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  Kaplan, Türkiye’de Milli E?itim ?deolojisi (National Education Ideology in Turkey), 199-200.
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  Vekiller neyle suçland???n? bilmeden hapiste (The Deputies are in Prison Without Knowing their Offences), http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/22530749.asp, (accessed 05 Feb. 2013). The USA ambassador Riccardione was accused of “not knowing his place” by the AKP government.
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  “TSK’nin Uzerinden Elinizi Çekin” (Keep Your Hands off the TSK), Cumhuriyet, 27 June 2009.
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  The President of the Constitutional Court, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, was elected as the President of the Republic for a seven-year period after the expiration of the term of Süleyman Demirel on 5 May 2000 and he was the greatest safeguard of the “Kemalist” state against the Islamist AKP government until 27 August 2007, when Abdullah Gül was elected as President.
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  “Özdemir ?nce, Bir ?ans Olarak Cumhurba?kan? Sezer” (The President of the Republic Sezer has a Chance), Hürriyet, 31 December 2005.
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  Tax supervision for the press was brought to the agenda during the term of AKP after 2008. The tax supervision was initiated against Do?an Group (one of the leading media groups of Turkey) in 2008, the first tax penalty, amounting to 840 million Turkish liras, was imposed on 18 February 2009, and the second penalty, amounting to 3 billion 750 million Turkish liras, was imposed on 8 September 2009. See Sedat Ergin, “Balyoz Delillerinde Bir Muamma” (A Bemusement in Balyoz Evidences), Hürriyet, 27 September 2012.
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  Even though the equivalent of the Turkish concepts of “millet” and “ulus” is the word “nation” in English, these two words gained some different contexts in Turkish over time. The equivalent of the word “nation” is the Turkish word “ulus” in today’s Turkish language. The Ottoman Empire was divided into different “millet”s on the basis of religious beliefs and “millet” meant a community dependent on a religion or religious order. The concept of “millet” has never been used to express an ethnic group or community having a common language, rather it has always been an administrative and cultural term that expresses people belonging to the same belief or religious order. Accordingly, Muslims were considered as a single “millet” even though they belong to different ethnic groups, live in different geographies and speak different languages. However, the context of the concept of “millet” started to change during the period of collapse of the Ottoman Empire and evolved to take the meaning of Turkish ethnic identity. After the Republic of Turkey was founded as a nation-state, it tried to turn into a “nation” on the basis of Turkish identity in such a way as to include different ethnic groups, Muslims and non-Muslims. The concept of “nation” which is a product of the French Revolution and is formed by excluding the religious norms from state and society life has gradually exceeded the meaning of just a certain ethnic identity and become a concept that includes everyone who is bound to a political authority with the bond of citizenship. Regarding the system of “millet” in the Ottoman Empire, see Bilal Ery?lmaz. Osmanl? Devletinde Millet Sistemi (The System of Millet in the Ottoman State). ?stanbul: A?aç Publications, 1992.
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  Erika Atzori, “Ankara’s Influence Gains Sway,” The Middle East, November 2011, 24
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  Hugh Pope, “Pax Ottomana,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 89, No. 6, November/December 2010, 164.
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  Turkish Islamists started to use the word “headscarf” which is an accessory traditionally used by Turkish women instead of the word “turban”. In this way, they started to appear before all segments of society with the slogan of traditional “freedom for headscarf” rather than with “turban” which became the symbol of Islamising the society/state. However, the content of the discourse did not change.
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  Erdo?an: Alevilik din de?il (Erdo?an: Alawism is not a Religion), http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/22653369.asp, (accessed 22 Fev. 2013).
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  Cüneyt Arcayürek, “O Biçim Anayasa” (What a Constitution This Is), Cumhuriyet, 6 December 2005.
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  Morton Abramowitz and Henri J. Barkey, “Turkey’s Transformers,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 88, No. 6 (November/December 2009), 128.